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This paper develops a model that integrates the climate and the global economy---an integrated assessment
model---with which different policy scenarios can be analyzed and compared. The model is a dynamic
stochastic general-equilibrium setup with a continuum of regions. Thus, it is a full stochastic general-equilibrium
version of RICE, Nordhaus's pioneering multi-region integrated assessment model. Like RICE, our
model features traded fossil fuel but otherwise has no markets across regions---there is no insurance
nor any intertemporal trade across them. The extreme form of market incompleteness is not fully realistic
but arguably not a decent approximation of reality. Its major advantage is that, along with a set of
reasonable assumptions on preferences, technology, and nature, it allows a closed-form model solution.
We use the model to assess the welfare consequences of carbon taxes that differ across as well as within
oil-consuming and -producing regions. We show that, surprisingly, only taxes on oil producers can
improve the climate: taxes on oil consumers have no effect at all. The calibrated model suggests large
differences in views on climate policy across regions.
John Hassler












Climate change engineered by human activity, i.e., by the burning of fossil fuel, is a pure
externality with global scope. Moreover, the scope is long-run. I.e., when John drives his
motorcycle to work, his use of gasoline causes emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere
and a consequent global heating, thus imposing a cost that not only hits all currently alive
humans but also future generations.2 The question is how much John should be restrained
in his driving. The climate problem is a text-book case of public economics, but the key
question|\how much?"|is a quantitative one. For example, although the scope is long-run,
the stock of atmospheric carbon slowly depreciates over time so generations very far away
are barely aected. More generally, for a reasonable quantitative analysis, the nature of
the problem really requires (i) a global perspective, (ii) a dynamic perspective, and (iii) an
equilibrium perspective. As for the latter, it is very important to have a fully micro-founded
model as any welfare calculations of dierent policy alternatives|such as dierent levels of
taxes or quotas|would require analysis of eects on global equilibrium prices. In this paper,
we provide such a setup.
More importantly, in this paper we focus on a fourth element: regional heterogene-
ity. Impact studies suggest highly heterogeneous damages in dierent regions in the world.
Moreover, policies are not adopted uniformly around the globe. The issue of heterogene-
ity, moreover, appears to be of rst-order importance. First of all, damage estimates dier
markedly across regions, both because the nature of the damages are dierent across regions
(depending on geophysical region dierences, dierences in the industry structure, and so
on) and because the response of temperature (and, more generally, of climate) to a given
global mean temperature increase is very dierent in dierent regions. Second, it is apparent
from the failures to agree on a global agenda to combat climate change that the views on
climate change diers markedly across regions. One reason for this surely is that dierent
regions suer to varying degrees (and some areas of the world even gain from global warm-
ing), but another is that the costs of restricting the use of fossil fuel energy dier across
regions. Third, fossil-fuel resources, in particular of oil, are unevenly spread over the world,
further strengthening the need to study regional implications of various policy alternatives.
This paper takes a step toward a multi-region analysis. Specically, we construct a
heterogeneous-region dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium integrated-assessment (phew!)
model, i.e., one integrating economics and climate change within an otherwise standard
modern macroeconomic setting. The model is surprisingly easy to solve; it can be solved in
closed form for the laissez-faire equilibrium, and a few simple but highly relevant alternative
policies can be fully analyzed. With this model, we are able to capture heterogeneity in
various forms. The general-equilibrium structure allows us to look at welfare eects of
policy; we use permanent percentage consumption equivalents as a measure. The analysis
here is only quantitative to a degree; the model has some short-comings that require a
somewhat more elaborate structure to address quantitatively. However, in many ways we
believe that the analysis herein is right in the middle of what one would more broadly
2John also owns a bicycle, which he fortunately uses more often than the motorcycle.
2consider a reasonable part of the parameter space, in particular for the degrees to which
dierent regions are in dierent positions on the climate-change issue.
We build a structure which, apart from the key factor of heterogeneity, is a simple version
of the model in Golosov et al. (2011). The assumptions there on preferences, technology,
and nature conveniently allow simple analysis. They are (i) preferences are logarithmic (thus
featuring risk aversion), (ii) capital can be accumulated but depreciates fully over a ten-year
horizon, (iii) production is Cobb-Douglas in capital, labor, and energy, (iv) energy is pro-
duced from oil, which is costless to produce but of which there is a nite stock, (v) damages
appear through a multiplicative factor on output whose logarithm is linear in the stock of
carbon, and (vi) the carbon cycle is linear. In the concluding section of this paper, we briey
review these assumptions|which ones appear critical for quantitative purposes and which
ones do not. The appearance of, and endogenous development of, alternative clean energy
is a key omission from the analysis, though the setting can be relatively straightforwardly
extended to include it.
How do we introduce heterogeneity across regions? First, we assume that there is a
continuum of dierent regions in the world economy, thus giving each region a negligible
impact on world markets. In our calibrated section, we lump regions together into four
groups|China, the U.S., Europe, and Africa|in an eort to draw out separate implications
for regions within these four distinguishable groups. We also calibrate so as to match available
damage estimates for these four groups. The world in our model is, moreover, divided into
two sub-groups of regions: oil consumers and oil producers. Consumers in these two groups
of regions have the same preferences but there is a stark but, we think, not all that unrealistic
assumption that oil-consuming regions do not produce any oil at all; conversely, the only
income of oil-producing regions is oil income. This assumption greatly simplies the analysis.
Moreover, damages dier across oil-consuming regions, as do capital stocks and productivity
levels. Countries trade in oil, of course, and the world price of oil is endogenous. In fact, there
will be a Hotelling-like formula for it, coming from the intertemporal utility maximization
of oil producers. Another key assumption for tractability is that regions cannot trade in any
other way: they cannot engage in either intertemporal trade or insurance. This assumption
is not realistic, but we show that in our calibration, the dierences across regions in their
marginal products of capital, and hence in their intertemporal marginal rates of substitution
of consumption, are closely aligned (though, of course, not literally identical).
We have several ndings. First, we look at a version of our model with very limited
heterogeneity: one where all oil-consuming regions are identical but where there is still a
distinction between oil consumers and oil producers. This model allows us to look at two
kinds of simple policy analyses. The rst one is an experiment where oil producers are
taxed on their prots, a tax that could be implemented internationally through taris on
oil. The tax is assumed to be accompanied by a lump-sum transfer of the tax receipts back
to oil producers, so that there is no net transfer. Here, if taxes on oil decline over time, oil
producers postpone their oil production, which is an improvement from a world perspective
as it postpones heating; the optimal rate of decline of taxes is about 0.3% per year, which
involves a 18% percent decline in energy use now. The second experiment is a uniform
3(across regions) tax on oil purchases (imposed on rms using oil), again with lump-sum
rebates so that there are no net transfers across regions. A quite surprising result is that
this experiment leads to no eect on oil use at all and, instead, only to a redistribution of
world resources away from oil producers|even though the taxes imply no transfers between
oil producers and oil consumers.
Second, we see that the dierences in views among oil-consuming regions are striking
quantitatively. Whereas China and the U.S. even would like to subsidize current oil pro-
duction, Europe and Africa would like signicant taxes. In terms of desired current oil use,
China would like to actually have a 15% higher oil use than currently and the U.S. would
like a 9% increase relative to status quo, whereas Europe would prefer to drop current oil
use by 46% and Africa by even more: 60%. In our model, dierences in initial capital
stocks or TFP levels, however, are immaterial. Thus, it is the dierential damage elasticities
alone|the percentage GDP losses incurred from a unit increase in the atmospheric carbon
concentration|that drive these dierences. Third, the eect of carbon leakage is very strong
in our model: a single region, such as the EU, could self-impose taxation on its oil use, but
this would only have a redistributive eect on oil use|there would be a zero aggregate ef-
fect. Thus there would be perfect leakage and no change in the climate at all. The unilateral
policy would (i) redistribute somewhat from oil producers to oil consumers, by lowering the
oil price, and (ii) redistribute from itself toward other oil consumers; whether the rst or
second of these dominates depends on the size of region.
This paper is by no means the rst one to provide an integrated analysis of climate and
the economy. William Nordhaus (see, e.g., Nordhaus 1977, 1994, and Nordhaus and Boyer,
2000, as well as the overview in Nordhaus, 2011) has pioneered the area by building integrated
assessment models around the neoclassical growth model, augmented essentially with (i) a
carbon cycle, (ii) a set of climate equations mapping atmospheric carbon into temperature,
(iii) an energy sector, and (iv) an abatement mechanism, allowing people to expend costly
resources to limit emissions from a given amount of use of fossil fuel. These models exist
in both versions with a single region (labeled DICE|Dynamic Integrated model of Climate
and the Economy) and with multiple regions (labeled RICE|Regional Integrated model of
Climate and the Economy). By using a well-known economic setting and simplifying the
climate model and the carbon cycle, Nordhaus's models oer a transparent framework for
analyzing the interaction between the economy and the climate. Following the increased
interest in global warming from the 1990s, the literature on integrated assessment models
has become quite broad; Kelly and Kolstad (1999) lists 21 integrated assessment models
constructed already in the 1990s. Most of these setups, however, lack explicit modeling of
endogenous economic responses to climate change and climate policy. Clarke et al. (2009)
provides an overview of ten integrated assessment models used frequently in the climate
science community. So far, these macroeconomic models have not received much attention
from macroeconomists. A reason for this is likely that the models typically are large and non-
transparent from the perspective of dynamic macroeconomic models with explicit markets
and price formation. MERGE, for example, is a popular model that exists in many versions
and Manne et al. (1995) reports that the economic part of the model itself contains 3,800
4variables; another popular model, IGEM, contains 4,000 endogenous variables (Nordhaus,
2011). Needless to say, while gaining in signicant realism in some dimensions, models
with this large number of variables must be restricted in other dimensions, typically by
limiting forward-looking, not allowing fully microeconomically founded market mechanisms,
or imposing behavioral restrictions.
Our approach here is to drastically cut down on the detail with which the climate and
energy sector are modeled in order to build a more transparent and easily communicated
integrated assessment model that allows both dynamics and stochastics in a multi-region
world. The setting is a quite close relative of Nordhaus's RICE model. In contrast, however,
our model allows an analysis of the decentralized equilibrium and is therefore fully equipped
to analyze dierent policy options in general equilibrium. Our approach here, aside from
allowing us to go quite far analytically, is also entirely in the \modern macroeconomic"
tradition. In particular, this allows an explicit modelling of uncertainty.
In Section 2 we set up and analyze the basic model. Section 3 looks at taxation from
an analytical perspective, whereas Section 4 solves the model and evaluates tax policies in
a calibrated version of the model; the calibrated model can also be solved analytically but
the purpose in this section is precisely a quantitative evaluation. Section 5 looks at two
extensions|one looking at carbon leakage due to policy dierences across oil-consuming
countries and the other at dierences in energy intensities across regions|and Section 6
concludes.
2 Decentralized economy
We directly set up the decentralized economy, which is autarkic across regions except for
the existence of trade in oil. We rst discuss the oil-using regions and then look at oil
producers. Thereafter we derive the equilibrium outcome and discuss climate and related
welfare evaluations.
2.1 Oil-using countries
A given country is characterized by a TFP level, which has an aggregate and an individual
component, each of which originates in climate factors as well as economic/institutional
factors. Let us summarize this variable, for now, by Ai. Ai moves over time and is stochastic.
It also depends on an aggregate variable|an externality|denoted S, which also evolves over
time, suppressed in the notation for the moment.
A country is also characterized by a level of capital. The labor input is abstracted from.
Allocations across consumers within a country are suppressed here|an interpretation is







5and the country's budget/resource constraint is




t   ptet  ^ yit
where p is the price of oil, also potentially random, and ^ y is dened as output net of oil
costs|total value added in the country. Thus, a country chooses a stochastic process for
capital and oil purchases to maximize the above objective subject to its resource constraint.




































Straightforward guessing and verifying using the Euler equation implies that saving follows












i.e., the saving rate out of net output is constant, despite productivity being random. Simi-
larly, country i's consumption level is (1  )yit. Thus, as a function of oil prices|which
are set internationally|and the productivity process|which is also externally determined|
we can fully solve the country's problem.
2.2 Oil-producing countries
We assume that there are many oil producers operating under perfect competition. An oil
producer, for simplicity, chooses only oil extraction; or, rather, it chooses how much oil







and the country's budget/resource constraint for consumption is
ct + ptRt+1 = ptRt;
with 0  Rt+1  Rt and where we recall that pt potentially is random.
This is a cake-eating problem with random returns; notice that we regard oil producers
as not being endowed with anything but oil|they have no other production technology.
Dening the budget as
ct + ~ Rt+1 = rt ~ Rt;
6having dened rt as
pt










which is solved by
~ Rt+1 = rt ~ Rt:








That is, despite the oil price being random, the oil producer chooses to extract a constant
fraction 1    of the remaining oil each period. Its consumption, moreover, equals ptEt =
pt(1 )Rt. In sum, because logarithmic utility implies that income eects equal substitution
eects, the price path for oil does not aect extraction: a high price in one period implies
both that extraction should increase at that time (the substitution eect) and that extraction
in other periods should increase (the income eect), with a net eect of no change at all.
2.3 Equilibrium oil prices
The equilibrium oil price is given by market clearing: the amount of oil extracted equals the
sum of all the oil consumed. Thus, we have






























Compared to a one-country world, or one in which there is full insurance across countries,









 > 1 (for positive xs). Intuitively, the demand for oil is held back by a distribution of world
resources that is not as skewed toward high marginal products of oil as it would otherwise
be.
Notice that, even though the model is forward-looking, the general-equilibrium solution
for prices can be obtained recursively|in a backward-looking fashion. This is because of the
particular combination of preferences and technology used here; it would in general be more
dicult.
If there is only one oil-consuming region (or a continuum of regions identical in all ways),
the equilibrium price will be
pt = Atk

t ((1   )Rt)
 1 ;
7net output will satisfy
^ yt = (1   )yt = (1   )Atk

t ((1   )Rt)
 ;
consumption of the oil consumer and oil producer will be given by (1      )yt and yt,
respectively, and saving will be determined by yt. This allocation is actually the same
allocation as the one in Golosov et al. (2011). In Golosov et al. (2011), the oil-producing and
oil-consuming regions are integrated and intertemporal markets automatically ensure that
capital and oil give the same equilibrium return; here they do but only because of the special
assumptions on preferences and technology. To show the return equalization formally, note
that pt+1=pt = (yt+1=yt)(Rt=Rt+1) = (yt+1=yt)= and that the return to capital saved at t
equals yt+1=kt+1|in both economies. Because kt+1 = yt, the return to capital becomes
(yt+1)=(yt) = pt+1=pt.
If there are more than one oil-consuming regions, we have that the return to capital in
region i equals yi;t+1=ki;t+1 = yi;t+1=(yit). Thus, since the oil expenses are a constant share









Thus, a given country's return to saving will dier from the return on saving oil, pt+1=pt,
to the extent that growth rate of its oil usage,
ei;t+1
eit , dier from the growth rate of world
oil usage, . If a given region grows it oil usage faster than the world average, its marginal
return to capital will be higher than in the rest of the world. Since the growth rate of
oil usage in a country equals the growth rate of output divided by the growth rate of oil
prices, the relative growth rate of oil usage of a given country equals its relative growth rate:
faster-growing countries, have higher returns to capital.
2.4 Implications for climate
Now let us look more carefully at the climate eects of oil use. This is a \one-way inves-
tigation" in this simple model: oil use is determined by competitive producers, who under
logarithmic utility will pump up a constant share of resources no matter what price path they
face. (Prices in turn adjust to make demand adjust to this supply.) Of course, departures
from this particular setting will break this link.
Let Ait = e iSt+Zit. Here, iSt is the damage from a global atmospheric carbon concen-
tration of St; dierent regions/countries have dierent sensitivities to global climate changes,
a fact strongly supported by the data. Zit represents \other" productivity determinants, in-
cluding technological and institutional change, but also temporary shocks like short-lived
temperature variations. We will regard Zit as exogenous. Parts of the recent growth lit-
erature argues that human-capital accumulation is more important than based on pure
productivity accounting. That insight could potentially be incorporated here by allowing
 to exceed the typically observed value for the share of income to physical capital; in the
calibrated section below, we nevertheless use a standard value for .
What is the link between emissions and damages? We assume that a unit of emissions at
time 0 leads to an increase in the atmospheric carbon concentration S0 of 1   d0 units|d0
8reects immediate leakage out of the atmosphere (into the biosphere etc.). In period t, more
of the carbon has disappeared; dt increases over time, though it does not go to 1. A linear
depreciation schedule, with time-varying rates, appears to be a good approximation.
Measured in units of the consumption good, the marginal per-period damage in region i





How these losses ought to be added up is far from obvious. We look at this issue next.
2.4.1 Assigning utility weights
In principle, one can assign utility weights to dierent regions and, given any set of weights,
it will be relevant for the welfare evaluation whether or not the allocation is near the optimal
allocation; in the almost-autarky equilibrium considered here there are strong restrictions
on trade and insurance, and the extent to which these constrains a world planner is an open
question. We consider some possible calculations below.
Regardless of the issue of how regions ought to be weighted, one can look at the equilib-
rium eect of global emissions on a given region. Computing the response of an emissions
increase of one unit at time zero, taking into account all the future eects, taking uncertainty
into account, and translating into current value in consumption units as it is evaluated by
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)^ yit
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t(1   dt)Et [it]:
Thus, the same formula as in the Golosov et al. (2011) context obtains: the damage is
proportional to current output in the region and, beyond that, only inuenced by basic
structural parameters governing carbon depreciation and damage elasticities.
Moving back to the issue of how losses could be added up across regions, consider again










i.e., a (net) output-weighted average of the damage coecients it. This calculation, however,
relies on considering production in dierent countries as substitutable. Production is indeed
if there are no restrictions on trade and if the world allocation is optimal. In the almost-
autarkic allocation we consider, however, there are (implicit) such restrictions. Therefore,
9if one took a utilitarian perspective instead and added marginal utils in a region-weighted














The key dierence between this expression and that above is that the damage coecients are
not output-weighted here, implying a larger weight on (production-)poorer regions. Thus,
how one perceives the damage costs depends on how close to a world-optimal consumption
allocation we assume that we are (and how that optimum is dened). A utilitarian perspec-
tive would imply that the current world is VERY far from such an optimum. An alternative,
consistent with the view that the current world is close to an optimum, is to use weights
that are equal to the time-0 inverse of marginal utilities in our respective regions|this way,
poorer regions' utils are scaled down in ways proportional to their consumption or wealth.












(1   )^ yi0it^ yit
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Here, output weighting appears again|but now for a dierent reason. Here the output
weights simply reect the planner's (subjective, and exogenous) weights placed on dierent
regions.
2.4.2 Direct costs and benets of interventions
In the specic model entertained here, consumption is a xed share 1     of output in
each region. Similarly, capital saving is a fraction  of output. The logarithm of output,
nally, is a xed-weight sum of the logarithms of (i) TFP, which is endogenous due to the
climate being endogenous, (ii) the capital stock, which in turn is a xed-weight sum of
past outputs, and (iii) the price of oil. The xed weights, throughout, depend on the three
parameters , , and , and if these parameters are identical across regions, the welfare
eects of interventions are particularly easy to study. Suppose a policy is undertaken which
does not alter the basic workings of the model but aects the path of energy use and oil prices
(along with output, capital accumulation, and consumption); we consider such policies in the
next section. Then in terms of the impact on the changes in the logarithm of consumption,
the impact will be identical for all countries except for that part of the impact that works
through climate change. The reason for the \identical" part is that changes in oil prices will
aect all countries equally, from the period of impact and dynamically forward, since capital
accumulation is a xed fraction of output at all times. The reason for the dierential impact
is simply that the climate sensitivities dier across region, as per by assumption through
the is. Thus, in the basic version of our model, countries with the same value of i will be
identically aected by climate policy, regardless of whether they are rich or poor in terms of
capital or TFP.3
3Below we also consider cases where the consumption share is varying over time. For those extensions, a
more elaborate discussion is needed than what is presented in the present section.
103 Taxation
Now let us introduce a (potentially time-varying) ad valorem tax on oil. Throughout, we
assume that government simply transfers the entire amount of the tax back to the taxed party
in a lump-sum manner. We will consider two taxation schemes. One taxes oil producers, and
the other taxes oil consumers. These two cases turn out to have very dierent implications
in terms of oil extraction and welfare.
3.1 Taxes on oil producers
We rst look at taxes on oil producers. These taxes can either be implemented by the
governments in the oil-producing countries themselves or it can be viewed as an import tax
levied by the oil-consuming countries. In either case, the tax proceeds would be rebated back
to the producers.4 This policy will inuence extraction, since there will be a substitution
eect for producers, but no income eect.
The budget constraint in an oil-producing country now reads
ct + pt (1   t)Rt+1 = pt (1   t)Rt + Tt;
or
ct + ~ Rt+1 (1   t) = rt ~ Rt (1   t) + Tt;
where t is the tax rate on oil and Tt is the transfer. The assumption that tax revenues are
rebated back implies 
~  Rt+1 + rt ~ Rt

t = Tt: (1)















ct = rt ~ Rt   ~ Rt+1;
the Euler equation becomes
1








4If the taxes are used for other purposes, the problem is very simple to solve. Just dene ~ rt = rt
1 t
1 t 1
and the solution is ~ Rt+1 = ~ rt ~ Rt:
11Express the solution as
~ Rt+1 = strt ~ Rt;
which is equivalent to Rt+1 = stRt: st is the fraction of the oil resource at t saved for period










Dening ^ st  st=(1   st), this can be written












Thus, one can solve for the st sequence in closed form given any sequence of tax rates. Thus,
one obtains oil production as a function of tax rates only.
Looking at simple versions of this expression, we rst see that a constant tax rate, which
means t = 1 at all dates, implies that st = , as in the laissez-faire case.5 This means not
only that a constant tax will not inuence the extraction path but that it will have no eect
at all on the equilibrium allocation.
Suppose, instead, that we introduce a tax sequence such that the growth rate of net-of-
tax rates, , is constant but not equal to one: taxes grow, or shrink, over time. Then it is
easy to verify that st = .6 For example, if tax rates decrease over time in such a way that
 > 1, the stock of oil will fall more slowly over time, and the initial-period outtake of oil
will be smaller. In particular, we will have a total extraction at t equal to
Rt   Rt+1 = (1   )()
tR0:
This taxation scheme will also inuence the price path. From the perspective of a lower
oil supply at time 0, it will raise the initial oil price. There will be a reinforcing eect by
a lower damage at time 0, increasing productivity and therefore oil demand. As a result,
capital accumulation is aected|it will likely fall, as less oil is used and net output hence
falls|and this counteracts the impact eect: this channel puts downward pressure on oil
demand. Over time these eects play out in a non-constant way: there will be transitional
5In fact, this result will obtain also if Ett+v = 1 for v > 0 if the growth rates of the net-of-tax rates are
also independent over time.
6It is also straightforward to analyze the case where a new permanent non-unitary value for  is introduced
next period with probability . Then, we know that if the tax is introduced, st+j =  for j  j. Thus,
st = 
















12dynamics. Furthermore, energy use long enough into the future will be higher than before,
reversing the impact eects. A full analysis of the resulting net eect over time on prices,
and hence on utilities of oil-using and oil-producing countries, is non-trivial. However, let us
briey again consider the case without heterogeneity among oil consumers. The allocations
will maintain the exact same form as before and hence
cpt = yt and cct = (1      )yt;
for producers and consumers, respectively, where yt = Atk
t ((1   )R0()t). Thus, both
regions are aected the same way by the tax policy!






plus a constant (dierent constants for the two regions), since saving is proportional to
consumption. Saving, in turn, satises
logkt+1 =  St + logkt +  log(1   ) + t log





t ( St + logkt +  log(1   ) + t log):
Noting that U = (1=)
P1
t=0 





















This expression can easily be solved out for
P1
t=0 
t logkt, which determines utility. Carrying











where we have also used a well-known formula for
P1
t=0 
tt. It is possible to show that the rst
of these terms is strictly increasing in  and that the remaining terms are a strictly concave
function of  with a maximum at  = 1. It follows from these facts that utility is maximized
for a  strictly above 1: there is no rst-order loss from raising  but there is a rst-order
gain. To see that the rst term is increasing in , note that since St =
Pt
s=0 Es(1 dt s) we









13plus a constant, where x 
P1
t=0 
t(1   dt) > 0. Hence, since Et = (1   )()tR0, the
precise depreciation structure is not important for how  inuences this expression: it suces
to determine how  inuences (1 )
P1
t=0(
2)t. This quantity equals (1 )=(1 
2),
whose derivative with respect to  is  (1 )=(1 
2)2 < 0. Thus the eect on utility of
increasing  is positive from this perspective: it delays the damages, and discounting makes
this benecial. Finally, to see how the two last terms are inuenced by  we need to examine
the behavior of log(1   ) +











Each of these terms are decreasing in  and at  = 1 the expression is zero.
3.2 Taxes on oil consumers
Suppose all oil-consuming regions use a tax of t on every dollar of oil purchases. Considering





it   ritkit   (1 + t)pteit
by choice of kit and eit. This implies that (1 + t)pteit = yit, i.e., that
pteit = ^ tyit;
where ^ t  =(1 + t).






and the resource constraint reads ct + kt+1 = Aitk
ite
it   pteit, since the tax revenues are
rebated back. Thus,
ct + kt+1 = (1   ^ t)yit:
Guessing that ki;t+1 = sityit, the Euler equation becomes
sit
1   sit   ^ t
= 
1
1   si;t+1   ^ t+1
:
This equation is solved by st =  whenever t = , i.e., whenever taxes are constant
over time. Otherwise, one needs to resort to numerical solution to obtain the saving rates.
Consumption is a higher fraction of output the higher is the tax on energy, since consumption
equals (1      ^ t)yit and ^ t decreases in t.









it ((1 + t)pt)
 1
1 
14for region i. The oil producer's problem is unaected by the taxes in the oil-consuming
regions: total oil production will equal (1   )Rt in period t. Market clearing for oil thus
reads

















































What are the welfare benets of taxation here? Suppose that all regions use the same
taxes. Then the equilibrium price of oil will be 1=(1 + t) times what it was in laissez-faire,
so energy use and output is the same as in the laissez-faire allocation in all regions, as is
capital accumulation. The only dierence is that, since the share of output paid for the oil
input is decreasing in the tax rate, there is more left over for consumption the higher is the
tax rate. From the perspective of oil consumers, the \best" tax rate on oil is innity at all
dates, leaving oil producers with a zero price on oil and thus zero resources to consume at all
times. In sum, taxes used in oil-consuming regions will lead to a redistribution of resources
but will not aect total energy use at all. Thus, the eects on the climate are nil.
The result that taxes in the oil-consuming regions cannot inuence the path of oil extrac-
tion is a result of assuming that oil producers have logarithmic utility functions. If they had
non-logarithmic utility, changes in oil demand would, through the eect on the equilibrium
oil price, be able to inuence oil extraction. With logarithmic utility, an increase in the oil
price at some date will introduce an income eect (extract less at this date to save more oil
for later dates) and a substitution eect (extract more at this date because it pays more)
but the two eects cancel exactly. With more (less) than logarithmic curvature, a decreased
oil price today|relative to those in the future|will lead to higher (lower) extraction today.
Thus, oil consumers can, by changing the domestic tax rates on oil over time, inuence the
extraction path. In order to delay extraction, one would need to use a path of increasing
(decreasing) tax rates on oil to the extent the oil producer has more (less) than logarithmic
curvature in utility.
3.3 Summing up
We learn from the above analysis that (ad-valorem) taxes on oil producers have several
convenient features. One is that total oil production can be inuenced, so long as the tax rates
on oil change over time; a constant tax on oil has no eect at all on the equilibrium. Looking
at the case of no heterogeneity among oil consumers, another convenient feature is that they
aect the utility of oil producers and oil consumers the same way|consumption changes by
the same percentage amount in the two groups, whichever time period is being considered. A
15third convenient feature is that the equilibrium can again be solved analytically. Considering
a decreasing tax path such that the net-of-tax rate grows at a constant rate, one obtains
simple formulas for welfare and it is possible to prove that there is a path of this form that
improves everyone's welfare.
Taxes on oil consumers, on the other hand, have no eect at all on oil extraction: they
only aect demand, and therefore only the equilibrium oil price, which we know has no
eect on extraction.7 From the perspective of correcting the climate externality, this kind
of tax is therefore not useful. This result does depend on our assumption that utility has
logarithmic curvature in consumption; in other cases, taxes that change over time will be able
to inuence oil supply, but the eect will be small unless curvature is far from logarithmic.
Taxes|even constant ones, in this case|do inuence the equilibrium allocation: they have,
rst and foremost, distributionary eects. If all oil-consuming regions coordinate, a tax will
allow these regions to capture surplus that the oil-producing regions would otherwise have
obtained: the equilibrium price of oil falls. From the perspective of oil consumers, an innite
tax would be best. If oil-consuming regions do not cooperate, a case we look at in Section
5.1, there will be carbon leakage from high-tax to low-tax countries causing redistribution
eects among them, and total damages may be aected as well.
In the next section we will consider specic quantitative examples with taxation levied
on producers.
4 Quantitative examples
Let us now calibrate the model in a stylized way. As we will discuss below in a little more
detail, in some respects|in particular, in its treatment of the energy supply|the model
here is too simple and therefore the welfare gains from optimal carbon policy are made look
smaller than they reallyl ought to be. However, the present model does allow us to show the
divergent views on this policy among regions.
4.1 Calibration
We use as the same carbon cycle as in Golosov et al., but allow heterogeneity in productivity
and climate damages. We use the exponential damage function as calibrated there but we
assume that there is heterogeneity in the damage parameter; we use Nordhaus's calibration in
RICE 2007 for the specic values. In RICE, a 2.5% increase in the global mean temperature
leads to an output-weighted loss of 1.5%. In Africa, the damages are 3.91%, i.e., 2.61 times
larger, whereas in OECD Europe, they are 2.83%, i.e., 1.89 times larger. The corresponding
ratios for China and the U.S. are 0.15 and 0.3, respectively. We use these ratios to calibrate
the region-specic damage parameters i.
Furthermore, we assume that productivity is permanently twice as high in the richer as in
the poorer countries. This assumption does not matter, however, for our welfare measures,
as indicated above: costs and benets from changing oil extraction are all proportional to
7Recall that this result comes about because oil producers have logarithmic utility.
16the level of output in this model. Similarly, the levels of the capital stocks do not matter.
We select these so that the marginal productivity of capital is not too dierent across regions
and smooth over the initial periods, i.e., neither showing sharp increases nor decreases.8
We set the current amount of fossil fuel in ground (R0) to match a laissez-faire increase in
the global mean temperature of 4 degrees Celsius, which matches the IPCC 2007 laissez-faire
scenario. The implied calibrated value for R0 is 1,963 GtC. We set the capital share  to
0.3 and the fossil fuel share, , to 0.04, a gure which is in between the values of the U.S.
and the EU. The common growth rate of productivity is assumed to be 2% per year, again
a gure that does not aect the welfare comparisons. The subjective discount rate, nally,
is set to 1.5% per year.
We also study a benchmark global economy without regional heterogeneity|the one-
region setup in Golosov et al.|and adopt the parameter values from that study. Those
parameter values imply a damage of 3.1% of output for a doubling of the CO2 concentration.
4.2 Model predictions
Consider rst the case of no heterogeneity. The laissez-faire allocation implies, as calibrated,
a temperature increase that peaks at 4 degrees with peak damages at 4.7% of output. For
this economy, we look for optimal tax policy within the class of ad-valorem tax rates on
producers|with compensating lump-sum transfers, as in Section 3.1|such that the net of
the tax, i.e., 1   t, grows at a constant rate . I.e., we maximize over . The optimal
value for  in our one-region calibration turns out to be 1.03, implying an initial drop of
18% of oil use. This is broadly consistent with the optimal policy found in Golosov et al.,
where optimal policy was allowed to be time-varying. Since the model is specied with
a period being a decade this means that the optimal ad-valorem tax rate should fall by
slightly less than 0.3% per year. The gain from implementing this tax path, expressed as a
compensating variation|a permanent percentage increase in consumption|is 0.09%. The
implied temperature peaks at 3.8 degrees but is somewhat delayed relative to laissez-faire
and the maximal damage is now 4.4%.
Turning to the case of heterogeneity, the results are quite dierent: there are substantial
dierences in optimal policies from the perspective of the dierent regions. We illustrate this
by looking at dierent values of  and their implications. Table 1 displays a range of values
for  and the associated initial levels of oil use relative to the laissez-faire outcome. The
values are chosen to be the optimal choice from the perspective of the 5 dierent regions we
consider|the four oil-consuming regions and the oil-producing region. The table illustrates
how the faster the rate of decline in taxes implies that oil use is delayed, hence leading to a
lower current oil use.
8Caselli and Feyrer (2007) study the dispersion of the marginal products of capital across countries and
argue that the dispersion is not large.
17gross growth rates, net-of-tax on oil:  0.975 0.985 1.038 1.075 1.098
initial oil use 115% 109% 76.9% 54% 39.7%
Table 1: initial oil use relative to laissez faire
Looking at the implications for heating, the laissez-faire allocation in the heterogeneous-
region model leads to very similar heating to that in the homogeneous case, but the damages
are very dierently distributed. They peak at 1.44% for the U.S. and a mere 0.7% for China.
However, they are as high as 11.8% and 8.7% for Africa and Europe, respectively.
Consequently, heterogeneity consequently implies that dierent values of  are optimal
from the perspective of dierent regions. Table 2 shows the compensating variations for the
dierent values of .
 0.975 0.985 1.038 1.075 1.098
China 0.05% 0.05% -0.33% -0.43% -0.61%
US 0.01% 0.02% -0.27% -0.98% -1.82%
Europe -0.42% -0.25% 0.51% 0.74% 0.59%
Africa -0.61% -0.37% 0.85% 1.51% 1.68%
oil producers -0.21% -0.12% 0.14% -0.08% -0.55%
Table 2: compensating variations and oil use relative to laissez faire
The low-damage regions would prefer no increases in the tax at all; in fact, their most
preferred values of  are 0.985 (U.S.) and 0.975 (China), which would thus increase heating
in the short run. The corresponding gures for Africa and Europe are a contrasting 1.098
and 1.075, respectively, implying a signicant delay in fossil-fuel use. As for oil producers,
they gain if and only if the world as a whole gain|given the preferences and technology
assumed here|and hence their most preferred  is near the value that was optimal in the
one-region world, and it is also right in between the optimal values for China and the U.S.,
on the one hand, and Europe and Africa, on the other.9
The analysis summarized in Table 2 reveals that the compensating variations are fairly
small quantitatively, as are the reductions in damages that can be achieved with this policy. Is
this a robust nding? The explanation for the nding in the present context is a combination
of assumptions: fossil fuel is a necessary input in production, it is not costly to extract, and it
exists in nite supply. This means (i) that all fossil fuel will eventually be used and (ii) that
tax policy can only change the time prole of oil use and not the total amount consumed.
A more realistic model should feature both oil and coal, where the latter exists in large but
nite supply, though with relatively high extraction costs.10 With an additional assumption
that an economically viable substitute for fossil will eventually be developed, such a model
would imply that policy can aect the total amount of fossil fuel extracted. The more would
9The one-region world is not an exact aggregation of the heterogeneous-region world, and hence the
optimal s dier slightly.
10Such a setting is analyzed in Golosov et al. (2011).
18be extracted, the higher are damages, and the higher is the value of an active carbon policy.
How much would be extracted would critically depend both on how much coal there is|
at an economically viable extraction cost|and how soon a clean \backstop" technology is
available. There are reasonably reliable estimates of the former, discussed in Golosov et al.
(2011), but how soon eective clean technologies appear is anybody's guess. In sum, our
simple setting here is not robust to reasonable extensions of the setting, but it should be
straightforward to add the missing features. With a potential for a large total fossil-fuel
extraction, there is also a scope for stronger disagreements on policy across regions of the
world.
We also report the global transitions for the dierent policy alternatives considered in
our experiments. In Figure 1, we plot global output relative to laissez faire for three values
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Figure 1: output paths relative to laissez faire for dierent policies
We see that a stronger policy stance, i.e., a higher , leads to lower current output but
higher long-run output. Break-even in terms of output|when output starts exceeding its
laissez-faire path|occurs in the 2050s for the weaker policy stance and about 10 years later
for the stronger stance. For the world as a whole, as explained above, with the discounting
assumed here, the weaker stance is optimal, whereas the stronger stance is optimal for Europe
and Africa.
Figure 2 shows the temperature development under laissez faire (which, again, is ap-
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Figure 2: global temperature paths for dierent policies
Temperature divergence across the dierent policy paths comes about slowly, since tem-
perature is a function of the carbon stock, to which we only make minor additions in any
given decade. The dierences across policy paths are at most a little less than 2 degrees
Celsius, and these dierences are reached in the latter half of the current century and then
only fade away rather slowly.
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Figure 3: interest rates across regions, globally optimal policy
There are signicant dierences, but the dierences are not very large. Thus, one might
expect that an extended model where the regions are allowed to trade in a risk-less bond|a
model where the marginal returns to capital would not be equated either, but would come
closer together|will not have very dierent implications.11 Figure 4 shows the interest rates
for the laissez-faire economy.
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Figure 4: interest rates across regions, laissez faire
5 Extensions
We look at two extensions: the possibility that taxes dier across oil-consuming regions and
that energy intensities dier across regions.
5.1 Dierent taxes on oil in dierent regions: carbon leakage
Because our model is a multi-region world, it is in principle straightforward to analyze tax
policies that dier across regions. This is of interest not only because of the presently
very large dierences in carbon taxation|and the apparent infeasibility to come to a world
agreement of uniform taxes/quotas|but also because it allows a transparent analysis of
carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs when one country taxes its own emission but other
countries do not: in that case, at least some of the reduction in emissions will \leak out"
and cause an increase in the other countries. How important are these eects? We do not
pursue a quantitative analysis here but we at least oer a simple qualitative model which,
when appropriately (and relatively easily) amended, can be made quantitative.






it   ritkit   (1 + it)pteit;
implying that (1 + it)pteit = yit so that
pteit = ^ ityit;
where ^ it  =(1 + it)|the same kind of notation as used in Section 3.2 above.







21with an associated resource constraint ct + kt+1 = Aitk
ite
it   pteit (tax revenues are, again,
rebated lump-sum). It follows that
ct + kt+1 = (1   ^ it)yit:
The saving rate will be a fraction of output: ki;t+1 = sityit. This implies an Euler equation
that turns into
sit
1   sit   ^ it
= 
1
1   si;t+1   ^ i;t+1
:
As in Section 3.2, this equation can only be solved explicitly if the tax rate does not change
over time. In this case, we obtain sit = , i.e., equal saving rates everywhere, even if
it = i is not the same across regions. However, as before, it is straightforward to solve this
dierence equation for any sequence of tax rates, as it does not involve any other endogenous
variables than the saving rate. In the case where the tax is constant over time, consumption
increases in the level of this tax: consumption equals (1      ^ i)yit at t, and ^ i decreases
in i, all in line with our previous ndings.
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for region i. As in the case of equal tax rates across oil-consuming countries, the oil producer's
problem has the same solution no matter what the taxes are: total oil production will still
equal (1 )Rt in period t. It remains to nd the price that clears the oil market. It satises

















































What are the new lessons relative to the case with uniform world taxation? As seen from
the formulas, a single region deciding to tax oil consumption domestically|while no other
regions imposes a tax on oil|will be able to decrease the equilibrium oil price, though less
for any given tax increase, of course. Now all the other regions will benet from the lower oil
price, without having the negative side eect of a higher tax rate. For the individual country,
the amount of oil use will be lower, and thus output lower as well, since pt(1 + it) is now
higher than under laissez-faire. Unless the country is \large", it is therefore unlikely that
the unilateral domestic tax increase will deliver higher utility. Thus, we have carbon leakage
out of the specic region, with the global amount of carbon consumption left unaected:
22there is \perfect leakage". Thus, any given oil-consuming region will prefer to have other
regions raise taxes on oil consumption. Some sort of coordination among oil consumers is
thus necessary in order for them to become better o.
The irrelevance result|taxes in the oil-consuming regions cannot inuence oil production|
does, as pointed out earlier, depend on logarithmic utility functions assumed for oil produc-
ers. What about the generality of the result that there is perfect leakage? It does, of course,
rely on the same assumption, i.e., logarithmic utility for oil producers. Of course, if en-
ergy can be produced from coal instead (as discussed in Section 4.2), coal having a positive
marginal cost so that the total amount of coal being extracted depends on demand, and
thus on taxes. There would then be less than perfect leakage, since lower world demand
would imply lower world supply, and what then would become important is the nature of
the marginal cost curve.
5.2 Dierences in energy intensities across time and countries
There are large dierences in the amount of energy used per unit of output produced in
dierent countries. In this model, we can think of this as being captured by dierences in ,
our Cobb-Douglas technology parameter. Moreover, there are systematic dierences across
levels of development in energy intensity, with low-income countries using much more energy
to produce each unit of output. Thus, one might also want to consider  to de dependent
on time, or technological development.
5.2.1 Regional decisions given world prices



































The Euler equation, assuming a guess of ki;t+1 = sityit, reads
1





































1   it   sit




1   it   sit
1   i;t+1   si;t+1
:
A special case is that where regions permanently have dierent intensities, a case where sit
becomes equal to  for all countries.
5.2.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium oil price is again given by market clearing: the amount of oil extracted
equals the sum of all the oil consumed. Thus, we have
















This equation no longer has a closed-form solution for pt, but it is at least not forward-
looking|it is one equation in one unknown.
5.2.3 A preliminary assessment, and oil vs. coal
The data on energy shares suggests relatively minor dierences across the major regions
considered in the quantitative analysis above. Spending on energy in Europe, gross of taxes,
is a slightly larger share of GDP in the U.S. than in Europe and China. It would seem
relevant to include these dierences in the empirical evaluation of the model. However, a
more relevant dierence from this perspective is the fact poorer countries use more coal than
oil. Oil is about ve time more expensive per carbon unit, presumably because it provides
more ecient/useful energy services. With a similar share of GDP spent on the sum of
oil and coal across countries but a much larger share of coal in poorer countries, we thus
see that emissions per GDP unit will be signicantly higher in poor countries. To model
these dierences in a more satisfactory manner, one would like to not only have both oil and
coal as energy inputs, but they would need to enter production in such a way that poorer
countries choose more coal than oil.12 To conclude, adding dierences in energy shares
makes the model solution only slightly more complicated and will at least marginally change
the quantitative analysis. However, from the perspective of climate change it would seem
necessary to at the same time generalize the structure to allow dierences in coal and oil use
across countries, an enterprise that is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
12This could be accomplished in several ways. One is to make the two inputs imperfectly substitutable and
have dierent complementarity properties with other inputs; oil could, for example, be more complementary
with capital than coal would be. Another is to make them perfect substitutes but simply assume that the
relative eciency of coal is lower in poorer countries, an assumption only a step away from the setting in
Golosov et al. (2011), which uses perfect substitutability.
246 Concluding remarks
Emission of greenhouse gases produces a global externality and calls for a global policy. So
far, however, it has proven very dicult to reach international agreements on such a policy.
In order to achieve progress on this front, it is central to understand the distributional
consequences of climate change as well as of policies aimed at mitigating the problem. In
this paper, we constructed a simple and transparent model allowing us to quantify how
key features of heterogeneity between dierent regions of the world aect their preferences
over dierent policy options. We show that in absence of international transfer mechanisms,
Pareto-improving policies to curb climate change may not exist, making it easy to understand
the diculty of coming to international agreements. Our models also shows that taxation of
fossil fuel use in oil-importing countries may be a completely toothless weapon against the
threat of climate change unless the tax receipts are transferred to oil-producing countries.
Our model is very stylized and some of its underlying assumptions are motivated by conve-
nience rather than by an aim to maximize realism. Let us therefore conclude by a discussion
of where we think we need to generalize the analysis. We have used logarithmic utility and
noted that the nding that fuel taxation in oil-consuming rather than oil-producing countries
has no eect is sensitive to this, although the basic mechanism of counteracting income and
substitution eects would remain with more general preferences and is unlikely to radically
alter our conclusion. Other preferences, as well as departures from Cobb-Douglas production
functions and full depreciation, would imply dierent transitional dynamics but would not
likely change the key conclusions in the paper (see Golosov et al. (2011) for a more thorough
discussion on this). There is, however, a number of assumptions that have the potential of
changing the results substantially.
First and perhaps most obviously, we have quite limited knowledge about the long-run
consequences of climate change. Substantial eorts by natural as well as social scientists are
devoted toward advancing our knowledge in this respect. If they come along, new insights
can easily be incorporated into our analysis.
Second, we have assumed that fossil fuel is (i) necessary for production, (ii) exists in
nite supply, (iii) can be extracted at zero costs, and (iv) is sold under perfect competition.
These assumptions are highly relevant for the qualitative as well as quantitative results here.
The assumptions are obviously debatable a priori and they also have some implications that
are dicult to reconcile with historical data. In particular, they imply that aggregate fossil
fuel use use should follow the famous Hotelling rule, which implies falling quantities and
increasing prices, a pattern notoriously at odds with reality. We therefore need to improve
our understanding of how the fossil fuel market functions. In other work, we have explored
some alternative assumptions to the ones used in this paper (Golosov et al., 2011, Hassler,
Krusell, and Olovsson, 2010 and 2011).
Third, we have treated technological change as exogenous and following a smooth trend.
Although we have argued in other work that this may be of little consequence for the issue of
how large optimal fossil fuel taxes ought to be, it is obvious that normative issues regarding
other policies, like R&D subsidies, as well as predictions about future fossil fuel use depend
on technological development and how it interacts with the policy considered in this paper.
25Finally, we have assumed that regions cannot insure each other or transfer resources
between them. Implicitly, we have also assumed that agents within regions have access to
perfect markets, allowing each region to be inhabited by a representative agent. Although
these assumptions have some amount of similarity with reality, in ongoing work we are
relaxing these stark assumptions, thus allowing a more realistic description of how agents
interact within and across regions.
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